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The twenty years since the end of the Cold War has seen a radical shift in the nature of the defence industrial sector, with a rationalisation of the number of companies involved. While something similar happened in the civilian aerospace market, which has become dominated by two giant rivals, the US-based Boeing Corporation and the European consortium of Airbus, it occurred over a much shorter timescale. For example, in the US defence market Boeing merged with McDonald Douglas in August 1997, Lockheed and Martin Marietta merged in March 1995 while Northrop Aircraft acquired Grumman Aerospace in April 1994.​[1]​ Today, the defence market is increasingly dominated by a smaller number of large multi-national companies that have global interests, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, EADS, Thales and BAE Systems. In conjunction with this slow but steady rationalisation, the end of the Cold War has meant that most Western countries have sought some form of 'peace dividend' and diverted resources away from defence to other areas of the public expenditure.​[2]​ For example, the United Kingdom's (UK's) defence expenditure had dropped as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from 4.6% in 1987 to 2.3% in 2006.​[3]​ This mirrored much of what was happening in the rest of NATO, with the average dropping from 2.09% in 1997 to 1.74% in 2006.​[4]​

These budgets have been put under severe pressure due to the financial crisis and recession from 2008 onwards, a pressure not helped by the slow economic recovery that seems to be on the way and the need to tackle sovereign debt. For the United Kingdom (UK), this resulted in the publication of a Strategic Defence and Security Review​[5]​ by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in October 2010 which outlined reductions to the defence budget, the number of platforms operated by the services and the numbers of civilian and service personnel. These cuts are being implemented despite the UK becoming involved in the crisis in Libya and continuing to operate in Afghanistan.​[6]​ In addition to this, weapon systems have been incorporating ever increasing amounts of cutting edge technology which itself requires additional expenditure on software development, systems integration and supporting technology such as satellites and real-time global communications. This has meant that the proportion of fixed costs to variable costs has been rising and that, combined with the decline in defence spending, has resulted in a decrease in the number of actual systems procured from one generation to the next, so that the unit production costs have risen as well.​[7]​





The origins of the JSF programme lay in the NATO studies conducted during the 1950s and 1960s which looked at the vulnerability of NATO airfields to Warsaw Pact air strikes, assuming these would be major targets during the opening phase of the assault. Many of the airfields hit would have been put out of action until substantial repair and clearance work had been undertaken, so there was thus a move to develop an aircraft that could land and take-off using very short pieces of runway (or even stretched of motorway) or even vertically, using almost any piece of flat ground. The major problem encountered was cost, with only two generations of Harrier and the Yak-38 seeing service.​[11]​

The immediate origins of the JSF lie in a number of programmes that arose during the mid-1980s and 1990s to replace various legacy systems procured during the 1960s and 1970s and operated by the US Air Force, US Navy and US Marine Corps (USMC), as well as a significant number of US Allies. This included, for example, the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, originally designed as a naval fighter but which went onto become a successful multi-role aircraft servicing with the US Air Force and USMC, as well as both the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. These programmes included:​[12]​
	Advanced Short Take-Off / Vertical Landing (ASTOVL, 1983 – 1994)
	STOVL Strike Fighter (1987 – 1994)
	Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF, 1993 – 1994)
	Multi-Role Fighter (MRF, 1990 – 1993)
	Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA, 1983 – 1991)
	Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF, 1990 – 1991)
	Advanced Attack / Advanced / Fighter Attack (A-X / A / F-X, 1992 – 1993)
	Joint Advanced Strike technology (JAST)





The JSF (or F-35 Lightning II) programme was set up with a tough mandate – to develop a highly capable, supportable yet affordable fighter that would be used to replace the legacy aircraft used by all three services, such as the F-15, F-16, A-10, F-117, A-6 and AV-8B.​[13]​ The move from what was in effect, a technology demonstration project, to a service mission capability acquisition programme, led to Requests for Proposals (RfP) being issued on 22 March 1996, to three of the four teams that had been involved with the CALF studies, who had been led by Boeing, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas. The three teams (all of whom had Pratt & Whitney as well as Rolls Royce participating) put forward three different, innovative designs and submitted bids for the $2.2bn Concept and Development Phase (CDP)​[14]​ but it was Boeing and Lockheed Martin that were selected to go forward on 16 November 1996, receiving $718m and $667m respectively to build two full-scale flying demonstrators over fifty-one months. The JAST Programme Office awarded the designations X-32 (A, B and C) and C-35 (A, B and C) to the two competing designs. Despite Pratt & Whitney having been selected to build the primary engine, a $96m multi-year contract was awarded to a team led by General Electric (including Allison Engines and Rolls Royce) to develop an alternative engine, as Congress was concerned over the lack of competition in that area. Finally, on 26 October 2001, it was announced that Lockheed Martin had won the CDP and would go onto the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase (later renamed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase).​[15]​



















With such a complex, multi-layered programme featuring cutting-edge technology, international defence industrial participation, multiple armed services and multiple international partners, problems were always going to arise, with a number of these impacting on UK participation. One of the earliest problems involved industrial workshare. For some of the smaller countries, such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, collaboration had already been shown to work with the F-16 European Co-Production Contract, signed on 7 June 1975, where all three countries had jointly ordered 348 aircraft​[18]​ and saw it as a way into the US defence market, something which had been difficult to do for European companies in the past.​[19]​ As part of signing up to the programme, the partners also signed up to the principles of best-value resourcing but it quickly became apparent that many governments simply had no idea what that actually meant in practise. The entire raison d'etre of the programme (and therefore using commercial practises as best-value resourcing) was to reduce development times, lower unit costs and fully integrate industry into the supply chain, meaning that Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technology could be incorporated into the design, in order to keep costs under control. However, it quickly became evident that many of the partner defence acquisition structures still had their basis in using defined workshare agreements, arranged and managed at the inter-governmental level.​[20]​

During the first few years of the SDD phase, the JSF Programme Office stuck quite rigidly to the rules on industrial participation and the concept of best-value resourcing. Despite this, only a small percentage of the contracts awarded were being given to companies from non-partner countries, such as Germany, Japan and Israel ($44m by 2003). Out of the partner countries, Canada were the clear leaders with a return of around 4000%, while the UK did well, reaping 24.2% of the contract awards for 6.2% of the developmental costs. While this didn't directly cause any problems for UK participation, it certainly impacted the overall programme as, given the huge disparities involved, several countries such as Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Turkey all complained, one or two even threatening to leave. Lockheed Martin, responsible for balancing partner expectations against programme goals, also found it had a role to play in dealing with the international politics of a multi-service, multi-partner programme and so gradually resorted to the use of 'strategic best-value sourcing methodologies' that allowed it to award a certain number of contracts in partner countries, where expectations had not been met.​[21]​

There have been problems related to the US Government's unwillingness to share sensitive technology. This was something that has been of direct interest to the UK and something that was promised would happen at the start of the programme, even drawing criticism from both Lockheed Martin and the US Government Accountability Office (US GAO).​[22]​ For the UK, this is linked to the question about its access to the millions of lines of software code that control the JSF – vital if it is to integrate domestically produced weapon systems, such as the Meteor. The question first came to prominence in late 2004​[23]​ and was supposedly settled after it had been escalated to the Executive level in 2007 (which also saw the signing of the US-UK Defence Cooperation Treaty, which was only ratified by Congress in September 2010). It was however, spectacularly reignited towards the end of 2009, when the Reuters News Agency​[24]​ conducted an interview with the Head of International Affairs at the JSF Programme Office, Jim Schreiber, where he revealed that the US would indeed be keeping the software coding all to itself, saying that "nobody's happy with it", a situation that was reported to Congress​[25]​ and has yet to be resolved to the UK's satisfaction. This took place at the same time as continuing efforts by the DoD (supported by the Administration) to terminate the F136 Alternate Engine Programme, which involved both Rolls Royce and General Electric. While Rolls Royce is also involved with the F135 engine, being under contract to Pratt & Whitney to provide the lift system components for the F-35B STOVL aircraft (a contract worth $1bn over ten years), it fell far short of the 40% partnership with General Electric in the F136. Cancellation would mean the loss of a significant amount of revenue for Rolls Royce, and despite unfavourable allied reaction, the programme was indeed cancelled on 25 April 2011.​[26]​

Another problem for the UK, and one that is clearly linked to the above, has been the operation of the US Export Control and Technology Transfer regime, controlled by the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). While most countries fully expect the USA to protect and carefully control how it shares its most sensitive and cutting edge military technology, what may not have been appreciated by the US Government (at least until very recently) is the degree to which the regime has been harming other countries' desire to collaboratively work with the US, for if 

". . . the United States and the UK, the two closest of allies, are unable to overcome the continuing obstacles to the efficient sharing of defence-related technologies, what hope is there for broader transatlantic defense industrial and technological cooperation?"​[27]​

The Pentagon itself has recognised the damage the regime has been causing and called it "a relic of the Cold War" which must be "adapted to address current threats."​[28]​ Recent research in the US highlighted the impact the regime is having and how European firms have been responding – almost every interview conducted, highlighted the view that saw "US defense trade controls as a 'barrier' significantly impeding Transatlantic cooperation" and that there was "clear evidence, beyond rhetoric, of a behavioural shift in Europe toward 'designing around' or 'designing out' components or subsystems regulated by ITAR which has a particularly adverse impact on US subsystem and component suppliers".​[29]​ The problem generates four key concerns: that of operational sovereignty; that any reliance on ITAR-controlled subsystems and components will generate a risk of schedule delays and cost increases; re-export restrictions and the complications the regulations generate for multi-national facilities.​[30]​ In fact, complaints about US export control and technology transfer policies have been around for a long time, and it is not clear how heavily such difficulties will weigh upon other governments when deciding to work with the US on military projects. However, the US must decide whether it can be indifferent to the willingness of other countries to participate in, and carry some of the costs of, high technology defence projects, in particular, the UK. Even with a budget that is over twice the rest of NATO combined, the cost of modern weapon system development is such that the US is finding the ability to spread some of the developmental costs among its allies is becoming more and more appealing, especially if it can be linked to overseas sales. To do that however, such equipment needs to address the fundamental issues of operational requirements and sovereignty, which have been critical to the UK in the JSF project.

Key Questions:  Cost vs. Technology

The UK experience with the JSF project highlights a number of important issues which are of general interest, but have particular relevance with regard to US-led international military cooperative programmes. The first issue is the fundamental question of whether policy-makers should pay any price to acquire the best possible military technology. 

Simply put: the JSF project indicates that the cost of having the best equipment may be now prohibitively expensive for most governments. Indeed, the proposition can be put forth that for most countries, the decision to obtain the most advanced technology available cannot be the sole factor (or possibly even the dominant factor) which drives procurement. At a minimum, it certainly should be considered much more carefully against the potential cost. 

The latest estimate is that the fly-away price of an F-35 is $161m per plane compared to the estimate of $81m in 2001.​[31]​ What may be more significant over the long run is the potential operating cost of the F-35. The US GAO estimates that the sustainment affordability target for the F-35A for the Air Force is $35,200 per flight hour while the cost for the F-16 it will replace is $22,500 per flight hour.​[32]​ The comparative data for the F-35 B and C and their legacy aircraft in the US inventory, which would be of particular importance to the UK, is not available.   

The argument could be made that the increase in costs is not simply due to the decision to get the best possible technology. Instead, it could be a result of the less than optimal acquisition process which has been followed on the JSF project. For example, it may not have been the best decision to proceed to production while still working on the development of the F-35. While such a process may have worked for Toyota in making cars, the GAO states its continuing concern regarding “the substantial concurrency, or overlap, of JSF development, test and production activities and the heightened risk it poses to achieving good program outcomes.”​[33]​ It notes that in 2011, the programme incurred an additional $373m in additional costs to retrofit already procured aircraft.​[34]​ Such an acquisition process also indicates why problems continue to arise in the programme, as indicated by the fact that the JSF achieved only six of 11 primary objectives it established for 2011.​[35]​ 

While such arguments are credible, it is hard to escape the conclusion that even with a perfectly designed project, it is the simple fact that governments which are working on the cutting-edge of technology will invariably see costs increase. The software lines of code for the JSF now number over 24 million.​[36]​ Thus, the JSF validates what may be the crux of the matter in any such initiative: acquisition decisions based on the initial estimate of the price of the item will invariably be incorrect. The only question is the size of the cost increase. For policy-makers, that should indicate a calculation on whether the risk involved in getting the best technology is excessively high and involves a potentially unacceptable cost.

One additional point which is part of such a deliberation is the issue of the extent of the technological gap between US and European defence technology. While there can be a discussion about the size of the gap, it would appear to be generally accepted that the US has a substantial lead over the UK and other European countries in the defence area. However, it is also clear that European firms have specific areas of technology in which they are very capable. While the case can be made that the US decision to pursue JSF as a multinational project may have been dominated by political concerns, it also appears that the US Government believed that European (and other) firms could make genuine contributions to the project. 

If this was the US Government's expectation, as borne out by the fact that BAE Systems (the UK's largest defence firm) is the largest subcontractor on the JSF, it raises a number of interesting issues for non-US decision-makers. The first question has already been highlighted: is the technological advantage held by the US in the defence arena so significant that European countries need to pay a premium to obtain that technology? That leads naturally to the second question: how much should the Europeans be willing to pay? While the general answer may be that it depends on the specific area (aviation vs. shipbuilding vs. vehicles), that answer emphasizes the point that European leaders cannot take the easy path of saying that it is always worth participating in a US-led project, irrespective of the area or the potential cost, as JSF indicates that could be much more than expected.

It also leads to a third, intriguing question: are there areas in which the US is interested in bringing in non-US technology? If so, this means that Europe and other countries have some negotiating leverage and it does not always have to be in the position of a supplicant in considering its participation in a US-led initiative. However, this would lead to the fourth and final question which Europeans and others should consider, based on the JSF experience and the workings of ITAR noted previously: what steps must they take in order to protect the intellectual property rights of their companies?





One of the other main reasons for the UK to sign on to the JSF is the importance it places on interoperability with US forces. Certainly, this is one of the policy objectives and a cornerstone of UK defence and security planning, and it is probably a consideration for any number of countries, particularly NATO allies. The JSF is a prime example of the significance of interoperability. It is critical to the power projection goals of the UK, and in most scenarios, the UK anticipates taking action alongside US forces. If that is indeed the case, it would be essential for the UK to maximize interoperability by having US equipment.

However, as with the issue of having the best available technology, the UK experience with the JSF project indicates that this could be a goal which may have too high a price. The significance of interoperability to the UK compared to cost was recently highlighted in the government decision regarding which version of the F-35 to acquire. It also indicates how cost can become the driving factor with regard to short-term vs. long-term decisions on the programme. 

The previous Labour government had decided on the F-35B STOVL version. When the current Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition came to power in 2010, it elected to switch to the F-35C carrier version, citing its longer range and higher payload and arguing that it would be cheaper overall than the F-35B.​[38]​ In addition, the SDSR noted that acquisition of the F-35C would allow for greater cooperation with Allies, particularly the US and France.​[39]​

However, the costs associated with the catapult and arrestor gear for the two UK carriers to allow the use of the F-35C increased far beyond expectations. The cost of “cats and traps” rose from £950m to about £2bn for the HMS Prince of Wales and to £2.5-3bn to retrofit the HMS Queen Elizabeth, the first carrier out of build.​[40]​ As a result, the government announced in 2012 that it would return to acquiring the F-35B. 

Viewed through the immediate policy perspective of balancing the defence budget and keeping the costs of the carrier and F-35 under control, this might arguably have been a sound decision. While there are still questions regarding the solutions and remedies found for the F-35B, it is certainly true that the plane is now off “probation.” However, such a decision would appear to be at cross-purposes with the goal of interoperability, particularly with the US, which was an important consideration for entering into the JSF programme in the first place.  

This is not to diminish the significance of interoperability with US and other forces. It is simply to highlight the fact that the UK experience with the JSF makes clear that it is not possible to pursue interoperability at all cost. Particularly at a time of tight defence budgets, the price of interoperability in any one area will have to be balanced against the possible reductions in development of defence capability in other areas.

Cost vs. Defence Industrial Base

One reason the F-35 has been a particularly important project for the UK is the impact on the UK defence industrial base, specifically on BAE Systems. The case can be made that the UK has stuck with the JSF despite the problems and cost increases due to the hope that BAE will be able to get a share of the maintenance and support arrangements for the F-35, commensurate with its participation in the development phase of the F-35 project. What the US GAO notes as a major challenge of affordability for the F-35 programme constitutes a significant opportunity for BAE and other UK firms. 

The GAO reports that the projected annual acquisition funding needs average more than $12.5bn through 2037 and life-cycle operating and support costs are estimated at $1.1 trillion.​[41]​ All of this is particularly critical for the UK in general and BAE in particular when compared to the long-term prospects for defence spending by other countries (generally bleak) for other military projects (there are few major acquisition projects on the horizon). In short, as a return on investment for the UK as a whole, the case could be made that the UK would benefit more from BAE participation in the project than the MOD would lose by acquiring a very expensive F-35.

However, these particular calculations need extensive scrutiny if they are to become the basis for national participation in projects such as the JSF. The first immediate question is whether it is prudent to assume that Lockheed Martin, as prime contractor, will give BAE a work-share of approximately 10%.​[42]​ Particularly in view of the fact that the US acquisition of F-35s is far more than that of other countries, it may not be self-evident that the BAE share in development will be reflected in the support arrangements.

The second argument turns to the question of whether the UK, in the case of the JSF or any other country in general, will reap the bulk of the benefits which fall to the company. While BAE is a UK firm, it has a separate and distinct US entity. It will be valuable to review the extent to which the financial benefits which accrue to BAE will result in increased jobs for UK workers or tax revenue for the UK Treasury.

The other aspect of this issue, which has been raised previously, is whether ITAR and other US regulations restrict the extent to which UK or other foreign firms will be able to have sufficient access to gain insights, knowledge and experience which will be of benefit to their companies. In any project, or for any country, the issue may come down to what particular area of knowledge or expertise is judged to be of value. Should the attraction be the opportunity to obtain an insight into cutting-edge military technology, the JSF experience, as highlighted above with regard to the access to source codes and US sharing of sensitive technology, indicates that countries should not go into such an endeavour with an overly optimistic expectation of what their national firms will achieve.

This does not diminish the potential significance for countries of participating in programmes like the JSF which can have an impact on the defence industrial base. Particularly with shrinking defence spending, the opportunities to have a part of such an extensive initiative will become quite rare. As will be emphasized below, that is particularly significant in a project where the US is basically willing to accept a substantial amount of the risk in maintaining the programme. 





Should the preceding analysis indicate that there are strong reasons for countries to not pursue participation in such initiatives, it must be emphasized that the JSF does provide strong reasons for participation.  One of the key aspects is exemplified by the fact that the JSF programme, despite all its problems, continues to move forward. Fundamentally, the JSF falls into the “too big to fail” category for defence acquisition. The future requirements of the US Air Force, Navy and Marines depend on the JSF being able to deliver a suitable aircraft which will meet the future fighter requirements for the three services for an extended period of time. 

Under such circumstances, there are reasons for the UK to stay in the JSF project. If the policy decision is made to get the best possible military technology, then the safest way to do so is by ensuring that there is a dominant partner that is able to bankroll the inevitable cost increases and delays inherent in any such project. Whatever process or technological problems may have arisen, the US will ensure that the project will not be dropped. More important, it ensures that while the UK may pay a higher price with regard to acquiring its fleet of F-35s, it is not up to the UK to find the additional finances to pay for the increased costs in the F-35 project. As a general point, if such considerations are important for the UK, it could be argued that they are even more important for the smaller countries that are participating in the programme. 

This leads to a corollary which is crucial regarding potential UK lessons from the JSF experience. Once again, the fact that the US has the lead and provides the bulk of the resources means that it will be ready to finance whatever steps may be needed to mitigate any risks. The US GAO reports that the new DoD baseline for the JSF project is a total acquisition cost of $395.7bn, an increase of $117.2bn (42%) from the prior 2007 baseline.​[43]​ It is hard to imagine the UK, or even a consortium of European nations, finding that level of funding for a military development project in the foreseeable future.

That is particularly significant when it comes to a cutting-edge programme like the JSF. While the track record of problems cannot be ignored, it is important to reiterate that the project is still proceeding, which means the problems have been resolved, which indicates the US commitment to finding solutions. All of which indicates a key consideration for the UK and any other country – for high-tech military projects, it may be essential to have a US lead to bankroll the risks.

What is the Security Policy Perspective?

The UK experience in the JSF project is useful in highlighting the fundamental questions which any country has to ask itself when faced with participation in a US-led programme like the F-35. First, what are the defence and security policy goals? Second, does participation in this project further the achievement of those national goals? The case can be made that the UK has utilised those optics in viewing its participation in the JSF. 

While there may be disagreements about the logic used in considering these questions and the answers which were generated, the UK certainly was clear about the policy perspective it utilised in deciding on JSF participation. First, it wished to have the best fighter available for the foreseeable future, and the JSF clearly qualified. Second, it remains essential for the UK to maintain interoperability with the US and the acquisition of the JSF offers a greater enhancement of interoperability than buying F/A-18 Super Hornets or any other fighter. 

Third, maintenance of the defence industrial base is of critical interest to the UK, and seizing an opportunity for BAE Systems and other UK firms, whether in the development of cutting-edge technology, or simple work-share, would appear to be a significant national concern. On this count, the UK experience regarding the issue of a Rolls Royce alternate engine is illuminating. While this was an essential item for the UK at the start of the JSF, the UK eventually agreed to the termination of the programme, regardless of the loss of revenue to Rolls Royce. The proposition can be put forth that the UK, in conducting a careful calculation, has determined that on balance there is a significant economic and commercial advantage which outweighs the “loss” of the work on the second engine for Rolls Royce, or the advantages to the overall programme of an alternative engine. 

Fourth, it can be asserted that the UK views as a significant advantage, the prospect of the US backing the JSF through to completion and addressing the problems in an inherently risky project. In view of the costs cited by the GAO and in a post-Cold War era where defence budgets have been shrinking steadily (encouraged by the current global recession), it looks to be an attractive (if not the only) way forward as it appears less and less plausible that any other single nation, or indeed a group of participating nations, would be able to handle the risks on a programme like the JSF.

Having made the calculated decisions on these various points, the UK decision to participate in the JSF appears to be justified when viewed through the optic of security policy. However, one simple optic for determining the “value” of the programme and the validity of the UK decision is the traditional envelope of performance, time and cost. On the issue of performance, if the F-35 ultimately does what it is expected to do, there is no question that it should be the preeminent fighter aircraft for some time. On the issue of time, it should be noted that the US GAO estimates that full rate production of the JSF is now planned for 2019, which means a delay of six years from the 2007 baseline.​[44]​ For the UK this is important, although the schedule for its acquisition of new aircraft carriers has slipped by roughly two years, which reduces the significance of JSF delays. 





The issue of which version of the F-35 is best for the UK crystallises what arguably may be the overriding policy concern for any nation considering participation in a project like the JSF. While the benefits and advantages noted above may still be realised by the UK, it is not clear whether they have been negated by delays and, more important, the significant increase in cost experienced in the programme. This lesson may well be one of the most important from the JSF experience: policy-makers should not underestimate the cost that may be involved in such a high-tech project.   
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